特色农产品供应链绿色投机行为的演化博弈分析

Evolution Game Analysis of Green Speculation in Characteristic Agricultural Products Supply Chain

  • 摘要: 投机行为滋生仍是滞碍特色农产品供应链绿色建设、威胁农产品质量安全的难题之一。因此,进一步厘清多主体间行为的演化机制及影响因素,对减少供应链绿色投机现象、达成特色农产品供应链绿色转型目标具有重要意义。本研究使用演化博弈法,以消费者、涉农企业和农户为主体构建三方动态演化博弈模型,分析各方策略选择及系统稳定性,并探讨各要素对主体决策的影响。结果表明:消费者的选择对于农户的投机行为存在抑制作用;当农户的次品检测能力较弱时,农户的策略倾向于较为保守,而随着检测能力的提升,农户的策略逐渐转向更加积极和合作;公司次品检测概率的提高有助于确保农产品质量,并增强消费者信任。

     

    Abstract: The breeding of speculation is still one of the difficult problems that block the green supply chain of characteristic agricultural products and threaten the quality and safety of agricultural products. Therefore, it is of great significance to further clarify the evolution mechanism and influencing factors of multi-subject behavior to reduce the green phenomenon of speculation in the supply chain so as to achieve the goal of green transformation in the supply chain of featured agricultural products. In this study, a three-party dynamic evolution game model with consumers, agriculture-related enterprises and farmers is constructed as the main body, the strategy selection and system stability of all parties are analyzed, and the influence of each element on the subject's decision is discussed. The results show that: the choice of consumers has an inhibitory effect on the speculative behavior of farmers; When farmers' defective product testing ability is weak, farmers' strategies tend to be more conservative, while with the improvement of testing ability, farmers' strategies gradually turn to be more active and cooperative;The improvement of the detection probability of defective products helps to ensure the quality of agricultural products and enhance the trust of consumers.

     

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