基于竞价博弈模型的地铁车辆成组维修研究

Research on Group Maintenance of Metro Vehicles Based on Bidding Game Model

  • 摘要: 为了实现地铁车辆维修和运营最佳效益的目的,提出了竞价博弈模型下多部件系统成组维修控制策略。在制定地铁车辆预防性维修计划时,运营部门期望车辆获得较高的上线率,维修部门期望降低部件维修成本;同时,期望维修总成本更低。根据维修和运营两部门效益诉求,基于现行的多级维修机制,引入两级维修策略,建立维修成本模型和可用度模型。以可靠度为竞价对象,建立轮流竞价博弈模型,满足二者经济效益均衡。基于成组维修模型,进一步从系统视角探究运营和维修部门的效益需求。算例结果表明:具有博弈决策终止权的部门,在维修决策中更具有定价优势,成组维修模型具有明显的综合经济效益。

     

    Abstract: To achieve the optimal benefits in subway vehicle maintenance and operation, this paper proposes a group maintenance control strategy for multi-component systems under the bidding game model. When formulating the preventive maintenance plan of subway vehicles, the operation department expects the vehicle to obtain a higher on-line rate, and the maintenance department expects to reduce the maintenance cost of components. At the same time, the total cost of maintenance is expected to be lower. According to the benefit demands of maintenance and operation departments, based on the current multi-level maintenance mechanism, a two-level maintenance strategy is introduced, and the maintenance cost model and availability model are established. Taking reliability as the bidding object, a rotation bidding game model is established to meet the economic benefit balance between the two. Based on the group maintenance model, the benefit demand of operation and maintenance department is further explored from a system-level perspective. The results of the example show that the department with the right to terminate the game decision has more pricing advantages in the maintenance decision, and the group maintenance model has obvious comprehensive economic benefits.

     

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